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United Nations Sales Convention
By PETER WINSHIP*
B.A., Harvard, 1965; LLB., Harvard, 1968; LLM, London. 1973; Associate
Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (Convention) was adopted in Vienna on April 11, 1980. t
As of May 1985, there were seven parties to the Convention-Argentina,
Egypt, France, Hungary, Lesotho, Syria, and Yugoslavia.2 The Conven-
tion will come into force approximately one year after it is adopted by ten
countries.3 It is likely that the Convention will come into force in 1986.
When the Convention does come into force it is possible that the United
States will be one of the original parties. President Reagan submitted the
Convention to the Senate in September 1983, with a recommendation
that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification.4 The Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings in April 1984, but has
deferred final consideration.
This brief essay sketches the background of the Convention, and
then summarizes its present status, scope, and general characteristics. A
final section of the essay illustrates the Convention by examining the
legal remedies it provides to an importer whose foreign seller fails to de-
* This essay is adapted from an outline of a talk delivered at the Fourth Annual Sympo-
sium on International Business and Taxation. The author gratefully acknowledges the exten-
sive editing of the law review staff.
1. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/18, Annex I (1980), reprinted in United Nations Conference on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records at 178-90. U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.97/19, U.N. Sales No. E.82.V.5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CISG or Convention].
2. Note by the Secretariat, Status of Conventions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/271 at 4 (1985).
Information about the current status of ratifications and accessions may be obtained from the
Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.
The Secretary General of the United Nations is the designated depository. CISG, supra note i,
art. 89.
3. CISG, supra note 1, art. 99(l) provides that the Convention will enter into force "'on
the first day of the month following the expiration of twelve months after the date of deposit of
the tenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
4. S. Doc. No. 98-9, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
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liver as promised.'
II. BACKGROUND OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SALES CONVENTION
The origin of the 1980 Convention can be traced to a project to draft
an international sales convention which began in 1930 under the auspices
of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT). Participants in this project included representatives from
the major legal systems of Western Europe, including a participant from
the United Kingdom to represent common-law systems. There was,
however, virtually no representation from Socialist or Third World coun-
tries and, except for the fleeting participation of Karl Llewellyn, the
United States was not involved.'
The UNIDROIT initiative culminated in 1964 with the adoption of
two sales conventions at a diplomatic conference at The Hague.7 One
convention covers the formation of international sales contracts while the
other governs the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Par-
ties to these conventions agree to enact as national law the uniform law
set out in the appendix to each convention. Although the conventions
came into force in 1972, only Belgium, The Gambia, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, San Marino,
and the United Kingdom are parties. A major reason for this poor rec-
ord of acceptance was the limited participation of non-European coun-
tries in the drafting of these conventions.
The Hague sales conventions were not enthusiastically received in
the United States. The United States, which did not become a member of
UNIDROIT until the end of 1963, decided only at the last moment to
send a delegation to the 1964 conference at The Hague. Although the
5. Since the essay makes no attempt to do more than introduce the Convention, a reader
interested in more detailed analysis should consult the growing number of studies of the Con-
vention. For a bibliography of writings on the United Nations Convention, see Winship, Bibli.
ography: International Sale of Goods, 18 INT'L LAW. 53 (1984). The indispensable
introduction to the Convention is J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (1982).
6. For a more detailed discussion of the background of the Convention, see Winship, Thec)
Scope of the Vienna Convention on International Sales Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL SALES
§ 1.01 (N. Galston & H. Smit eds. 1984).
7. The official French and English texts of the Hague sales conventions and the uniform
laws appended to the conventions appear in 834 U.N.T.S. 107, 169 (1972). For a sympathetic
early analysis of the uniform laws by a member of the United States delegation to the 1964
conference, see Honnold, The Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods: The Hague
Convention of 1964, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 326 (1965). For a bibliography of studies of
these Hague conventions, see 27 AM. J. COMp. L. 345-49 (1979).
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United States' delegation participated actively at the conference, it ex-
pressed grave reservations about the adopted texts. The delegation's re-
port to the Secretary of State concluded that the texts contain several
serious weaknesses: (1) the focus is on trade between contiguous nations
and does not pay sufficient attention to overseas shipments; (2) the con-
vention does not provide balanced reciprocal rights and obligations for
sellers and buyers; and (3) several key concepts are so complex that trad-
ers can not readily understand them. In its conclusion the delegation
recommended that the United States not become a party to the Hague
sales conventions.8 The United States took no further formal action with
respect to the conventions.
Soon after the 1964 conference, the United Nations General Assem-
bly established a Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL
or the Commission) to study how to eliminate legal obstacles to interna-
tional trade. At its first session in 1968, the Commission resolved to give
priority to a review of the Hague sales conventions and in 1969 the Com-
mission appointed a Working Group on Sales to carry out this review.
This Group worked for almost a decade to redraft the 1964 convention
before presenting a consolidated draft convention to the Commission.
After reviewing the resulting text, the Commission approved the UNCI-
TRAL draft in 1978 and then circulated it to governments and interested
international organizations. On the Commission's recommendation, the
United Nations General Assembly convened a diplomatic conference in
Vienna in March 1980 to consider the UNCITRAL draft.9 Sixty-two
nations sent delegations to the Vienna conference. After five weeks of
intense debate, a roll call vote was taken on a final text: forty-two nations
voted in favor, none against, and nine countries abstained. The official
text closely resembles the 1978 UNCITRAL draft text.' 0
Delegates from the United States participated actively in UNCI-
TRAL and its Working Group during the lengthy deliberations on the
8. Report of the Delegation to the 1964 Conference at The Hague, reprinted in NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAvs, HANDBOOK 237
(1964).
9. For a useful summary of the background to the 1978 UNCITRAL draft convention,
see Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Good" An Over-
view, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 223 (1979) (Professor Honnold's essay introduces a collection of
articles which analyze the 1978 text).
10. Apparently the delegations that abstained on the final vote did not have authority to
vote on a final text. The official documents, including summary records of plenary and com-
mittee meetings, are published in the conferences Official Records, supra note 1. For brief
summaries of the conference debates, see J. HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 54-56; Perrott, The
Vienna Convention 1980 on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980 INT'L CoNr. L
& FIN. REv. 577.
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draft text. These delegates were briefed by the Secretary of State's Advi-
sory Committee on Private International Law, composed of representa-
tives of major legal organizations such as the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Associa-
tion. The State Department also appointed a special study group with
members knowledgeable in the legal and business problems of interna-
tional trade. The United States delegates to the Vienna conference, John
0. Honnold, E. Allan Farnsworth, and Peter H. Pfund, voted in favor of
the final text at the conference, and subsequently recommended to the
Secretary of State that the United States become a party to the
Convention. I
III. PRESENT STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SALES CONVENTION
Article 91 of the Convention provided that the Convention was to
remain open for signature until September 30, 1981. Twenty-one coun-
tries signed by this deadline, including Austria, Chile, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, the Nether-
lands, Norway, People's Republic of China, Poland, Singapore, Sweden,
the United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.' 2 By signing the Conven-
tion, these countries undertook an implicit obligation to seek ratification
in accordance with their domestic constitutional procedures. Countries
which did not sign by the September 30, 1981, deadline may accede to
the Convention at any time.
13
Article 99(1) provides that the Convention will enter into force "on
the first day of the month after the date of deposit of the tenth instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession." As of May 1985, Ar-
gentina, Egypt, France, Hungary, Lesotho, Syria, and Yugoslavia had
ratified or acceded."' Other countries, as noted below, are presently con-
11. J. HONNOLD, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CONFERENCE ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (1981). For
discussion of the role of the special advisory committee to the State Department, see Landau,
Background to U.S. Participation in United Nations Convention on Contracts for tihe Interna.
tional Sale of Goods, 18 INT'L LAW. 29 (1984); Speidel, Book Review, 5 N.W. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 432 (1983). For a history of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private
International Law, see Pfund, U.S. Participation in International Unification of Private Law, 19
INT'L LAW. 505 (1985).
12. Note by the Secretariat, supra note 2, at 4.
13. CISG, supra note 1, art. 91(3).
14. Note by the Secretariat, supra note 2, at 4.
(Vol, 8
Export-Import Sales
sidering ratification or accession and informed sources now suggest the
Convention will come into force in 1986.
A. Prospects for Ratification or Accession Outside the United States
Although reliable information is difficult to obtain, several sources
report that the following countries are presently considering ratification
or accession to the Vienna Convention: Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, People's Republic of China, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, and Vene-
zuela. The Nordic countries, which already share a uniform sales law,
have agreed to become parties to the Convention at the same time.tS
In addition, a number of important governmental and international
business organizations have recommended that the Convention come
into force. For example, at a meeting in Moscow in March 1983, the
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance gave general approval to the
Convention. In September 1983, the Law Association for Asia and the
Western Pacific adopted a resolution urging governments in the Asian-
Pacific region to accede to the Convention. The Asian-African Consulta-
tive Committee has also recommended that its member countries become
parties. Among business groups, the Commission on International Con-
tract Practices of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has
urged the national committees of the ICC to encourage their respective
governments to adhere to the Convention. In addition, several recent
conferences have publicized the Convention's provisions.' 6
Despite interest in the Convention, ratifications and accessions have
been slow. An examination of the reasons why several countries have
hesitated explains the delay."7
1. The United Kingdom
The Law Society in Britain has recommended that the United King-
dom not adhere to the 1980 Sales Convention, at least not until its major
trading partners decide to do so. This recommendation does not, how-
ever, reflect opposition in principle to uniform sales rules. The United
Kingdom is a party to the 1964 Hague sales conventions, albeit with the
15. See generally Sono, The Role of UNCITRAL, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note
6, §4.06; U.S. Mission at the United Nations (unclassified telegram), 17th Plenary Session of
UNCITRAL (October 15, 1984).
16. See generally Sono, supra note 15. For the International Chamber of Commerce posi-
tion, see ICC Commission on International Commercial Practice, U.N. Convention on Inter-
national Sale of Goods Working Party, Revised Draft Commentary, Doc. 460/291 (1983).
17. For further elaboration on the status of the Convention in the United Kingdom, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada, see Winship, The Present Status ofthe 1980 U..
Sales Convention, in WORLD TRADE AND TRADE FINANCE ch. 10 (J. Norton ed. 1985).
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Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
reservation that contracting parties must affirmatively choose to have the
uniform laws apply. If the United Kingdom were to adopt the Conven-
tion, it would have to denounce the Hague conventions. Moreover, par-
ties who agree to resolve disputes by arbitration in England might select
the Convention rather than English law as the governing law. The Law
Society Report frankly states the legal community's concern about losing
business and gives this concern as a reason for not supporting the
Convention. 18
2. The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany, like the United Kingdom, has
ratified the Hague conventions and its experience with the uniform laws
may explain its absence from the vanguard of support for the 1980 Con-
vention. The Federal Republic was one of the first countries to ratify the
1964 conventions and it expected other countries to follow its example.
The uniform laws were not widely adopted, however, and the Federal
Republic now wants to avoid a repeat of that experience. At the same
time, the uniform sales laws do provide uniform rules for transactions
with some of the Federal Republic of Germany's major trading partners,
such as Italy and the Benelux countries. The Federal Republic, there-
fore, does not want to risk denouncing the earlier conventions until it
knows whether its trading partners will adopt the 1980 Convention.'
9
3. Canada
Although the Canadian federal government has given serious con-
sideration to the Convention, Canada is unlikely to accede to the Con-
vention in the near future. The principal problem is constitutional: the
federal government has limited treaty power with respect to private inter-
national law conventions. Each province must accept the Convention
before it takes effect in that province. Furthermore, there is concern
about the potential disruption to United States-Canada trade, which rep-
resents a major part of Canada's foreign commerce.20
18. See Law Society Council, Law Reform Committee, 1980 Con vention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, LAW SocIETY GAZETTE 653 (1981). For the Law Reform
Committee's full statement, see International Sale of Goods: Hearing on Treaty Doe. 98.9
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of
Frank Orban) [hereinafter cited as Hearing].
19. Schlechtriem, Recent Developments in International Sales Law, 18 ISRAEL L. RtV.
309 (1983); see also Magnus, European Experience with the Hague Sales Law, 3 CoMP. L. Y.B.
105 (1979).
20. Ziegel, Should Canada Adopt the International Sales Convention?, in NEW DEVt LOP-
MENTS IN THE LAW OF EXPORT SALES 67, 81 (1983).
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B. Prospects in the United States
The United States has taken significant formal steps to ratify the
Convention.2" The United States signed the Convention on August 31,
1981, and President Reagan sent it to the Senate on September 21, 1983,
with the request that the Senate give its consent to ratification. The Con-
vention was forwarded to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
which held hearings on April 4, 1984. Although the committee planned
to take up the Convention in September 1984, the leadership decided to
defer consideration until the new Congress convened in 1985. At least
one reason for this decision was a letter from Senator Richard Lugar (R-
Ind.), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, to Secretary of
State George Shultz. The letter asked Shultz to respond to the following
questions: (1) Is there evidence of specific cases of difficulties caused by
the absence of the Vienna Convention? (2) Why should parties be re-
quired to "opt out" rather than to "opt in" to the Convention's provi-
sions? and (3) What are the specific differences between United States
commercial law and the Convention?2 2 Secretary Shultz responded
promptly through a delegate, but the questions had raised doubts and
support for ratification could not be mustered, particularly with the 1984
elections looming. Proponents of the Convention are now gathering evi-
dence of the difficulties caused by the absence of the Convention to sub-
mit to Senator Lugar, who has become chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in the new Congress.23
Outside the political arena, the Convention has had a favorable re-
ception. A number of business and legal organizations have publicly sup-
ported ratification by the United States. These organizations include the
four leading associations representing businesses involved in interna-
tional trade: the National Foreign Trade Council, the American Associ-
ation of Exporters and Importers, Business International, and the United
States Council for International Business. Other organizations endorsing
the Convention include the American Bar Association, the American
Arbitration Association, and the Lawyers' Committee for the Conven-
21. For a detailed description of the steps taken in the United States, see Winship, supra
note 17, § 10.05.
22. Letter from Senator Richard Lugar to Secretary of State George Shultz (Aug. 10,
1984), available in the files of Hastings International and Comparative Law Review.
23. Winship, supra note 17, § 10.05. Senator Lugar's letter states in part that "I have
asked that consideration be deferred until I am assured that the U.S. business community
which will be affected by this proposed Convention is thoroughly familiar with it and has
indicated its views of the Convention." Supra note 22. The status of the Convention in the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is summarized by a Memorandum from Peter H.
Pfund to Members of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee (Sept. 21, 1984).
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tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. On the other
hand, several business organizations, such as the National Association of
Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce, whose
members are not primarily engaged in international trade, have given
lukewarm support to the Convention. The only organizations which, af-
ter studying the Convention, have withheld their endorsement are the
American Corporate Counsel Association and the Heritage Foundation.
The principal objection of these organizations is that ratification without
further study would be premature.24
IV. SCOPE AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE CONVENTION
The scope of the United Nations Sales Convention is summarized by
the following outline of the table of contents.
1. Part I (Arts. 1-13): The two chapters of this part define the
Convention's sphere of application and set out general rules of
interpretation.
2. Part II (Arts. 14-24): These articles codify the rules governing
the formation of the international sales contracts.
3. Part III (Arts. 25-88): The five chapters in this part regulate the
rights, obligations, and remedies of the parties to international sales
contracts.
4. Part IV (Arts. 89-101): This final part defines the relation of the
Convention to other international agreements, sets out the reservations
countries are authorized to make when they ratify or accede to the Con-
vention, and provides rules for implementation of the Convention.
Much of the two 1964 uniform sales laws has been incorporated into
Parts II and III of the Convention. As a concession to countries con-
cerned about this consolidation, Article 92 provides that a country may
choose not to adopt one or the other of these two parts when it ratifies or
accedes to the Convention.25
24. See generally Winship, supra note 17. For the position of the Heritage Foundation,
see BROOKS, WHY CONGRESS SHOULD BE WARY OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (1984). The American Corporate Counsel Association adopted
the following statement: "The Association Board takes no position on the question of the
ratification of the convention. The board is concerned that the existence of the convention and
its effect on international sales is not yet widely known throughout the business community or
by corporate counsel representing medium and small firms." Reprinted in Hearing, supra note
18, at 37.
25. See Winship, supra note 6, §§ 1.02-.03.
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The general rule defining the Convention's sphere of application,
Article 1(1), states:
This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties
whose places of business are in different States: (a) when the States
are Contracting States [i.e., countries that have ratified or acceded to
the convention]; or (b) when the rules of private international law [i.e.,
choice-of-law rules] lead to the application of the law of a Contracting
State.
26
This general rule is supplemented by several other provisions. Article
1(2) requires that both parties have notice that their businesses are in
different countries, while Article 10 provides guidelines for identifying
the relevant place of business when a party has more than one.
A potential limitation on the sphere of application of the Conven-
tion is set forth in Article 95, which authorizes a country to declare, at
the time of ratification or accession, that it will not be bound by Article
l(1)(b). Thus, a court sitting in a country which has made this declara-
tion would apply the Convention only if the parties before the court have
their places of business in contracting states.2 7
Other important limitations on the Convention's application are
found in Articles 2-5, which exclude certain transactions and issues from
the Convention's coverage. The most important of these exclusions are:
(a) sales to consumers (Art. 2(a));
(b) issues of validity, such as mistake, fraud, duress, unconsciona-
bility, and illegality (Art. 4(a));
(c) issues relating to property interests in the goods sold (Art. 4(b));
and
(d) claims for death or personal injury caused by defects in the
goods sold (Art. 5). In general, only disputes between a seller and a
merchant buyer are governed by the Convention.
Even if a sales transaction falls within the scope of the Convention,
the parties are free to vary the effect of its provisions or even to exclude it
altogether. Article 6 provides that "[t]he parties may exclude the appli-
cation of this Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary
the effect of any of its provisions."28 Trade usage and course of dealing
may also vary the effect of the Convention's provisions.29 Whether the
26. CISG, supra note 1, art. 1().
27. See Winship, supra note 6, §§ 1.02-.03. The United States plans to make the reserva-
tion permitted by Article 95.
28. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
29. Id. art. 9 provides:
1985]
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language of Article 6 permits exclusion by implication, however, is un-
clear, although the better interpretation of the Convention's history and
policy indicates implied exclusions are permitted.
Articles 7 and 8 contain guidelines for interpreting the Convention.
Article 7(1) states that when interpreting the Convention "regard is to be
had to its international character and the need to promote uniformity in
its application and the observance of good faith in international trade,'"3
Recognizing that situations not contemplated by the Convention's rules
will arise, Article 7(2) states that "gaps" are to be filled by application of
the Convention's general principles or, if there are no relevant general
principles, the domestic sales law to which the forum's choice-of-law
rules lead. Other than the statement in Article 7(1), however, the Con-
vention does not expressly define its general principles. It has been sug-
gested that the following three principles are implicit in the text of the
Convention: (1) a duty to compensate a party for expenses incurred in
reliance on the representations of another party; (2) a duty to communi-
cate information needed by the other party; and (3) a duty of a non-
breaching party to mitigate the loss resulting from a breach of contract."'
The rules for the interpretation of the parties' agreement are generally
less complicated, although Article 8 asks the reader to consider both the
subjective intent of the parties and the objective meaning of their
conduct.
32
Despite differences of general approach and style between the Con-
vention and the Uniform Commercial Code, most commentators con-
clude that the common-law lawyer should have little difficulty working
with the Convention.
33
Two statements supporting ratification of the Convention by the
United States summarize the characteristics of the Convention which
make it attractive to export-import traders and their legal advisers.
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any
practices which they have established between themselves.
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a use of which the parties knew or ought
to have known and which in international trade is likely known to, and regularly
observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade
concerned.
30. Id. art. 7(1).
31. J. HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 99.
32. See Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 265, 286-88 (1984), for an analysis criticizing
Article 8.
33. See, e.g., the assessment of the formation provisions in Winship, Formation of Iterna-
tional Sales Contracts Under the 1980 Vienna Convention, 17 INT'L LAW, 1 (1983).
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From a business perspective, the American Association of Exporters and
Importers (AAEI) gives the following reasons for endorsing ratification:
The main advantage of the Convention is that it will provide an agreed
set of rules for the many international sales transactions in which it
would otherwise be unclear what law governs. The rules laid down are
generally reasonable and not too far from our domestic sales law as
embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code. These international rules
(and in due course also a body of interpretive materials) will be readily
available in English. As a result, there will be greater certainty as to
the applicable legal rules in a variety of disputed situations and less
chance that an American exporter or importer will find himself subject
to a rule of law far from his normal expectations.
3 4
The AAEI reiterated its support for prompt ratification even after the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations decided to defer consideration."
From a legal perspective, the American Bar Association also favors
prompt ratification by the United States. Its report states in part:
The United States would benefit in the following ways if it were to sign
and ratify the convention. For U.S. business interests the CISG will:
-avoid the difficulties of reaching agreement with foreign buyers
and sellers on choice of forum or applicable law clauses because
the CISG text will be a readily available compromise;
-permit the parties to shape their rights and obligations to arrive
at results similar to those that could be reached under the Uni-
form Commercial Code without fear of foreign "mandatory"
rules;
-- decrease legal costs which might otherwise be incurred in the
research of many different foreign laws because it will be easier
to research the CISG text and legislative history, which is avail-
able in an official English text and will no doubt be extensively
annotated; and
-reduce problems of proof of foreign law in domestic or foreign
courts.
In addition, the United States will gain political goodwill by its en-
dorsement of the product of UNCITRAL, a broad-based and apoliti-
cal arm of the United Nations.
36
Despite the delay in Senate consideration of the Convention, the Ameri-
34. Hearing, supra note 18, at 78-79. The AAEI makes its recommendation even though
it admits that exporters and importers could live with the present patchwork of national laws.
Id at 78.
35. Letter from Eugene J. Milosh, president of the A.A.E.I., to Senator Charles Percy
(Nov. 30, 1984).
36. A.B.A. 1981 Report to the House of Delegates, reprinted in 18 INT'L LAW. 39-40
(1984).
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can Bar Association continues to work for prompt ratification by the
United States.37
V. ILLUSTRATION: BUYERS' REMEDIES
Analysis of the following simple hypothetical case illustrates how
the Convention might operate in practice: Export Company in Singa-
pore agrees to sell to Importer in San Francisco 20,000 electronic wid-
gets, shipment to be made by air freight from Singapore before December
31. Export Company does not ship the widgets by the agreed date,
What remedies does Importer have under the Convention?38
An attorney researching this problem will find that Importer has
remedies under two principle clusters of articles of the Convention: Arti-
cles 45-52 (remedies available only to the buyer) and Articles 71-88 (rem-
edies available to both buyers and sellers). In addition, the introductory
articles of Part III set out several relevant provisions, including a defini-
tion of "fundamental breach." 9
In theory, Importer will first consider bringing an action of specific
performance when Export Company fails to deliver. Article 46(1) pro-
vides: "The buyer may require performance by the seller of this obliga-
tion unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with
this requirement."40
Importer's claim to specific performance is significantly limited,
however, by an earlier general provision of the Convention. Article 28
provides:
If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is
entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a
court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless
the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts
of sale not governed by this Convention.
4 1
Given the common-law traditions of both the United States and Singa-
37. The A.B.A. Section of International Law and Practice has established an ad hoe com-
mittee, chaired by David N. Goldsweig, to promote the Convention. The ad hoe committee
plans to sponsor several symposia around the country to bring the Convention to the attention
of United States lawyers. The Section's Comparative Law Division has a Private International
Law Committee which is also mobilizing support for the Convention under the direction or
Reed R. Kathrein and Grant R. Ackerman.
38. Assume that the Convention is in force, that both Singapore and the United States are
parties to the Convention, and that the contract does not include a choice-of-law clause ex-
cluding application of the Convention.
39. CISG, supra note 1, art. 25.
40. Id. art. 46(l).
41. Id. art. 28.
[Vol. 8
Export-Import Sales
pore, Importer probably could not obtain specific performance under the
Convention. In any event, Importer is unlikely to demand specific per-
formance because enforcement would be costly and difficult and Im-
porter can probably purchase similar widgets on the widget market.
Moreover, Importer would be less than confident about obtaining ade-
quate performance from Export Company after the breach.4Z
Rather than specific performance, Importer is more likely to de-
mand cancellation, or, as the Convention would say, "avoidance" of the
contract. If certain conditions are met, Importer may avoid the contract
and thereby release both parties from their contract obligations, subject
to the recovery of damages.43 In general, the Convention will not permit
Importer to avoid the contract for minor defaults. Even in the case of
non-delivery, Importer does not automatically have a right to cancel:
either the non-delivery must be a "fundamental breach" or Export Com-
pany must fail to deliver within an additional period of time granted by
the Importer.' Article 25 defines a fundamental breach as follows:
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if
it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to de-
prive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the
party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same
kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a
result.
45
In this example, a fundamental breach occurs if Export Company never
ships the widgets. If, however, Export Company makes or proposes to
make a late shipment, the breach may not be fundamental.46 After learn-
ing that the widgets will not be shipped within the contract time, Im-
porter may grant Export Company a reasonable extension of time within
which to perform.4 7 During this period Importer may not avoid the
42. For a discussion of the Convention's specific performance provisions, see Farnsworth.
Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. CoMp. L. 247, 249-51 (1979): see also Comment, Rem-
edies Under the U.N. Con vention for the International Sale of Goods. 2 I1T'L TAX & B us. L
79, 96-99 (1984).
43. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 49, 81; see also id. art. 26, stating: "A declaration or
avoidance of the contract is effective only if made by notice to the other party.- For discus-
sions of the avoidance provisions, see Ziegel, The Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales
Convention: Some Common Law Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL SALis, supra note 6.
§ 9.03[2]; Michida, Cancellation of Contract, 27 AM. J. CoMp. L. 279 (1979).
44. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1).
45. Id. art. 25.
46. For criticism of the fundamental breach provisions, see Ziegel, supra note 43.
§ 9.03[2][b].
47. This provision is frequently called Nochfrist after a similar German institution from
which the Convention provision is borrowed.
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Convention. If Export Company, however, fails to deliver within this
additional time, Importer may avoid the contract regardless of whether
the non-delivery is a fundamental breach. By taking advantage of this
notice provision, the Importer avoids the difficult determination of
whether the original non-delivery is a fundamental breach.48
If Importer has not avoided the contract, Export Company has a
right to force Importer to declare his intentions. Knowing that it cannot
make timely delivery, Export Company may notify Importer that it pro-
poses to ship the widgets late. This notice, if received by Importer, oper-
ates as a request that Importer inform Export Company whether late
delivery will be accepted. Importer is free to accept or deny this request,
but if Importer accepts or does not respond, Export Company may make
delivery within the time specified and Importer may not avoid the con-
tract during this period.49
Even if Importer may not avoid the contract or if he chooses not to
do so, Importer may be entitled to recover damages. The general dam-
age formula provides for recovery of "a sum equal to the loss, including
loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the
breach."' 0 This formula would seem to encompass incidental and conse-
quential damages, subject, however, to two significant limitations:
(a) damages may not exceed those damages foreseeable at the time of
contracting; and (b) damages will be reduced by the amount which the
non-breaching party failed to mitigate.5' If Importer avoids the contract
following non-delivery, the general formula is supplemented by the more
specific damage formulas of Articles 75 and 76, which allow Importer to
recover the cover-contract price differential or market-contract price
differential.52
VI. CONCLUSION
The Convention should be judged by whether it improves the pres-
ent situation. Applying this test, most commentators conclude that the
Convention is an improvement. This single text of the Convention will
displace the numerous different sales laws which domestic courts would
otherwise have to apply when choice-of-law rules require application of
48. CISG, supra note 1, art. 47.
49. Id. art. 48(2)-(4).
50. Id. art. 74.
51. Id. arts. 74, 77. See also id. art. 82 (a party may not rely on the other party's failure to
perform when the first party caused the failure); cf U.C.C. § 2-715.
52. Id. arts. 75, 76; cf U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713.
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foreign law.53 The Convention will also provide a readily available text
for parties who cannot agree on the national law to govern their contract.
Moreover, the Convention's provisions will be a repository of model
clauses which international traders may incorporate into their contracts.
The importance of the Convention should not be exaggerated. As the
American Association of Exporters and Importers has stated,"4 most in-
ternational traders can live with the present patchwork of national sales
laws. But even if its contribution is modest, the Convention will satisfy
the laudable UNCITRAL objective of eliminating unnecessary legal bar-
riers to the free flow of international trade.
53. This is not to say that choice-of-law rules will be altogether irrelevant once the Con-
vention comes into effect. As noted earlier, choice-of-law rules remain important in two differ-
ent contexts. When a forum's choice-of-law rules lead to the law of a Contracting State, the
Convention will be applicable by virtue of Article l(l)(b). More importantly, gaps in the Con-
vention text which cannot be filled by the Convention's general principles are to be filled by
reference to the national law which would be applicable by virtue of the forum's choice-of-law
rules. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
54. See Hearing, supra note 18.
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